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Recent Developments

Baker v. General Motors, Corp.:

R

eversing the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, the
Supreme Court in Baker v.
General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct.
657 (1998), held that an
injunction barring an employee
from testifying against his former
employer did not prevent him
from testifying in a proceeding in
another state pursuant to a
subpoena issued in that state.
The decision illustrates the
Court's intent to prevent a state
from interfering in matters which it
lacks authority to resolve under
the ambit of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution.
The Court maintained that it was
not creating an exception to the
requirement of full faith and credit,
it was simply recognizing that a
judgment granted in one state
cannot determine evidentiary
issues in a suit brought in another
state.
For
the
fifteen
years
preceding this litigation, Ronald
Elwell ("Elwell") was employed by
General Motors Corporation
("GM") as an engineer analyst.
His primary responsibility was to
evaluate the performance of GM
vehicles
and
make
recommendations
for
improvement. He also served as
an expert witness for GM in
products
liability
actions,
defending the safety and crash
worthiness of GM vehicles. After
the employment relationship
soured, and Elwell agreed to
retire within two years, Elwell was
subpoenaed to testify in a
Georgia products liability action
against GM. He testified that the
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fuel system of the GM vehicle in
which plaintiffs decedent was
riding was inferior in comparison
with other vehicles in its class.
The following year, Elwell sued
GM in Michigan for wrongful
discharge and other tort and
contract claims.
In
its
counterclaim, GM alleged that
Elwell had breached his fiduciary
duty to GM by disclosing
privileged information by testifying
in the Georgia action.
In August, 1992, Elwell and
GM entered into an agreement
under which Elwell agreed to a
permanent injunction barring him
from testifying as a witness in any
litigation involving GM. Although
the only specific exception to the
injunction was in reference to the
Georgia action in which Elwell
had already been deposed, the
agreement contained a general
exception as well. GM and Elwell
agreed that if Elwell's testimony
was ordered by another court,
compliance with that order would
not be actionable as a violation of
the injunction.
Since the

injunction was entered, Elwell
testified against GM in several
jurisdictions
pursuant
to
subpoenas
ordering
his
appearance.
The current action involved
one of the cases in which Elwell
had been ordered to testify.
Kenneth and Steven Baker sued
GM in Missouri claiming their
mother died in a collision in which
the GM vehicle she was driving
caught fire because of a faulty
fuel pump. The Bakers sought to
depose Elwell as a witness and
GM objected based on the
injunction obtained in Michigan.
The Bakers maintained that the
Michigan injunction did not
override a Missouri subpoena
and pOinted out the general
exception in the injunction which
provided that Elwell could testify
in an action if a court so ordered.
After reviewing the Michigan
injunction, the Federal District
Court in Missouri allowed Elwell
to testify at trial. The court held
that enforcing the injunction would
violate Missouri's public policy
which
only shielded from
disclosure
privileged
or
confidential information.
The United States Court of ~
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court's
decision by holding that the
district court erroneously relied on
Missouri's public policy favoring
the disclosure of information that
is not privileged. The court of
appeals held that Missouri has an
equally strong public policy
favoring that full faith and credit
be given to judgments obtained in
other states. The Supreme Court
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granted certiorari to decide
whether the full faith and credit
requirement estopped the Bakers
from procuring Elwell's testimony
in their Missouri lawsuit against
GM. Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 663.
The Court noted that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of Article
IV of the
United States
Constitution provides that a
judgment granted in one state,
"qualifies
for
recognition
throughout the land," provided
that it was granted by a court with
authority over the persons and
subject matter of the suit. Id. at
663-664. Therefore, for purposes
of claim and issue preclusion, a
judgment granted in one state
warrants recognition nationwide.
Id. at 664.
Observance of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not
compel a state to follow another
state's procedures for enforcing
judgments. Id. at 665. Further,
judgments granted in one state
that have interfered with litigation
over which the granting state had
no authority have been denied
enforcement and held ineffective.
Id. at 665 (citing Fall v. Eastin,
215 U.S. 1 (1909)).
While maintaining the effects
of the Michigan judgment
between Elwell and GM could not
be
extended
beyond
controversies under the specific
control of the Michigan court, the
Court noted that the injunction
could operate "to preclude [Elwell]
from volunteering his testimony"
in pending or future litigation in
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Michigan. Id. at 667. However,
the Court stated, this judgment
does not operate to dictate to a
court in another state that
relevant evidence should be
deemed inadmissable based on
the injunction. Id. The Court held
that "Michigan's power does not
reach into a Missouri courtroom
to displace the forum's own
determination whether to admit or
exclude evidence relevant" in the
case before it. Id.
. According to the Court, this
ruling did not suggest that a state
may refuse to honor another
state's judgments based on public
policy preferences or that this is
an exception to the Full Faith and
It merely
Credit Clause. Id.
preserves the concept that an
injunction awarded in Michigan
cannot operate to determine
evidentiary issues in a suit
pending in Missouri when the
parties were not subject to the
jurisdiction of the Michigan court.
Id. This does not, as Justice
Kennedy wrote in his concurring
opinion, compel a sweeping
exception to the full faith and
credit requirement. Id. at 670
(Kennedy, J., concurring). This
judgment, according to the
majority, is denied full faith and
credit protection because it
attempted to interfere with claims
that were not under the control of
the Michigan court. Id. at 667.
As Justice Scalia pOinted out in
his concurring opinion, "[t]he
Missouri court was no more
obliged to enforce the Michigan

injunction by preventing Elwell
from presenting his testimony
than it was obliged to enforce it by
holding Elwell in contempt." Id. at
668 (Scalia, J., concurring). In
other words, full faith and credit
does not require Missouri to
execute the injunction which was
granted in Michigan and if GM
wishes the Michigan injunction to
be given force in Missouri, it must
be made a judgment in Missouri.
Id.
Holding that a state has no
authority to control proceedings
outside its jurisdiction by shielding
a witness from the state's
subpoena power, the Supreme
Court clarified the fact that
recognition under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause is only owed to
matters that the state which
issued the judgment has authority
to resolve. This decision narrows
the options for businesses
attempting to keep information
acquired during the employment
relationship confidential. Knowing
that a court- ordered injunction
may not be given full effect in
proceedings outside the state in
which it was granted, employers
may be less willing to offer
consideration for an employee's
silence regarding potentially
damaging information. It may
also make products liability
actions easier to litigate because
it opens the door to the use of
vicarious admission testimony,
thereby giving plaintiffs a vehicle
through which to gain important
evidence.

